The e ectiveness of traditional type checking in C is limited by the presence of type conversions using type casts. Because the C standard allows arbitrary type conversions between pointer types, neither C compilers, nor tools such as lint, can guarantee type safety in the presence of such type conversions. In particular, by using casts involving pointers to structures (C structs), a programmer can interpret any memory region to be of any desired type, further compromising C's weak type system. Not only do type casts make program vulnerable to type errors, they hinder program comprehension and maintenance by creating latent dependencies between seemingly independent pieces of code.
Introduction
In C, a pointer of a given type can be cast into any other pointer type. Because of this, a programmer can interpret any region of memory to be of any type. Traditional type checking for C cannot enforce that such reinterpretation of memory is done in a meaningful way, because the C standard allows arbitrary type conversions between pointer types. For this reason, C compilers and tools such as lint do not provide any warnings against potential runtime errors arising from the use of casts. We motivate the problem of type safety in C programs using the following two examples. Example 1. Consider the code fragment in Figure 1 . Because of the cast (ColorPoint *), a structure of type Point can be interpreted as a structure of type ColorPoint. If the sole dereference of pointer pcp in the program were pcp->x, the program would work correctly, because the x eld is present in both structures at the same o set. However, the dereference pcp->color can cause unexpected behavior. Neither cc nor lint issues a warning for this program. An overly conservative type checker for C could disallow the cast from a value of type Point * to a ColorPoint *, regardless of whether the eld color is dereferenced from pcp. Unfortunately, C programs contain casts with surprising frequency SCKR99], and a type checker that disallows all casts would, in practice, outlaw too many programs.
Example 2. Consider the code fragment in Figure 2 . In this code, the cast (Radio *) converts a type Clock * (the type of c + 1 as the same as the type of c) to type Radio *. This program would be declared unsafe by a conservative type checker that rejects all casts. At rst glance, this decision appears to be reasonable, because the cast seems to make no sense. However, notice that c points to the rst eld of the structure ClockRadio. Because of C's pointer-arithmetic rules, the expression c + 1 yields typedef struct f int x,y; g Point; typedef struct f int x, y, color; g ColorPoint; main() f An example of the \+1" casting idiom. By C's type rules, the expression (c + 1) has the same type as c. Therefore, the cast at the second statement is from Clock* to Radio*. Because Radio follows Clock in struct ClockRadio, the cast is actually safe.
the address of|i.e., a pointer to|the beginning of the second eld of ClockRadio. A pointer to this eld can correctly be dereferenced for a frequency eld, as is done in this example. This program relies on the fact that c points to a region in memory that contains a Clock structure followed by a Radio structure (and also on the fact that the size of Clock is such that no padding is required between the elds clock and radio). Although this usage appears contrived, we have found it used frequently in production code (see SCKR99] ). These examples show that C programmers implicitly rely on the physical layout of structs in memory. This makes type checking di cult: a type checker that is based only on manifest types in the program would either be too conservative, or, like a C compiler, would permit potential run-time errors to go undetected. Moreover, casts are used heavily in C programs, particularly in systems software. Table 1 presents empirical data from a suite of C programs. binutils  516  1109  188  xemacs  288  1662  70  gcc  208  410  137  telephone  110  126  430  bash  76  123  47  vortex  67  592  50  ijpeg  31  74  601  perl  27  101  15  xkernel  37  1882  179  Total  1360  6079  1717   Table 1 : Count of casts in a suite of C programs SCKR99]|SPEC95 benchmarks gcc, ijpeg, perl, vortex, GNU utilities bash, binutils, xemacs, networking code xkernel, and portions from a Lucent Technologies's product code telephone. kLOC is the number of source lines (in thousands). The Void-Struct column gives the total number of casts in which a void* was converted to a pointer to a struct (or vice versa), and the Struct-Struct column gives the number of casts in which both the types involved were pointers to structs. These numbers include both implicit and explicit casts.
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Physical Type Checking
In this paper, we develop a new form of type checking for C programs, called physical type checking, that is based on the physical layout of structs in memory. The goal of physical type checking is to provide static safety checks for pointer dereferences in a program. A program that passes these static safety checks is declared to be physically type safe.
In the rst example (Figure 1 ), our type-checking algorithm would declare the program to be unsafe, because the actual type of p, Point, does not have a eld color, which is required because of the dereference pcp->color. If the program did not contain the statement pcp->color = RED, our algorithm would declare the program to be type safe, because the requirements on the structure pcp would be satis ed by its actual type. In the second example (Figure 2 ), our algorithm would declare the program to be type safe, because the requirements on the structure cr are satis ed by its actual type. Physical type checking is carried out by a ow-insensitive, context-insensitive, interprocedural analysis algorithm. In terms of how this analysis relates to previous work, the most signi cant aspects are as follows:
The physical-type-checking algorithm is cast as a type-inference problem: For the most part, the analysis ignores the declared types in a program, and relies on inference to compute a \required" type for each variable in the program whose address is taken. In recent years, a number of other papers have also used type inference as a mechanism for specifying ow-insensitive analyses (see Section 6). There are some similarities between the physical-type-checking algorithm and previous work on ow-insensitive points-to analysis And94, Ste96, SH97, YHR99]. The relationship between physical type checking and points-to analysis is addressed in Section 4.3.
Physical type checking is useful for a number of purposes. Its most obvious application is to discover potential physical type errors caused by inconsistent type interpretations of memory. Just as a tool such as LClint Eva96] statically identi es certain classes of errors in programs, physical type checking detects another class of errors that traditional C type checking misses. Physical type checking also has a number of applications in software-engineering tools: The information obtained can help a programmer to understand the ways type casts are used in programs, to uncover hidden dependences between di erent C types, and to retro t more stringent type declarations to variables or function arguments. A slightly simpli ed type system for C. Type quali ers are ignored (e.g., const int and volatile int are treated as int). Furthermore, typedefs are considered to be synonyms for the types they rede ne.
Contributions
The starting point for our work is the observation that C programs that use type casts require type checking that is more powerful than the standard type-checking system for C (which is based only on variables' declared types). The paper's contributions can be categorized as follows:
We formulate an alternative type system for C based on the physical layout of structs in memory. We give an inference-based algorithm to perform such type checking for C programs. We also describe an implementation of the algorithm that uses an o -the-shelf constraint solver. In previous work, we had introduced a notion of physical subtyping between struct types. However, this work did not handle pointer elds inside structures. In this paper, we introduce a way to handle subtyping in the presence of pointer elds.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some ideas from our previous work SCKR99] that we draw upon in later sections. Section 3 presents the basic approach behind our physical-type-checking algorithm, and describes certain problems with pointers that hinder our approach. Section 4 presents the actual algorithm and shows how it solves these problems. We describe our implementation in Section 5. Section 6 discusses related work.
Preliminaries
In this section, we de ne what we mean by physical type safety, and review the notion of physical subtyping, which was introduced in SCKR99]. Our work addresses a slightly simpli ed version of the ANSI C type system, as shown in Figure 3 . Members and bit-elds of struct and union types are annotated with an o set. In a struct, the o set of a member indicates the di erence in bytes between the storage location of this member and the rst member of the struct. The rst member is, by de nition, at o set 0. All union members have o set 0.
The computation of other o sets is compiler dependent, but must follow a number of requirements, as set down in the ANSI C standard. In particular, C compilers lay out compatible pre xes of two structures identically. We discuss the data-layout issue further in Appendix A.
It is useful to de ne a number of auxiliary functions for a type t:
stype(e) is the compiler-assigned type of a C expression e; sizeof (t) is the standard C sizeof function; o set(t; x) is the o set of eld x in struct or union type t.
We assume that the statements in an input program have been normalized to consist of only a few simple forms, shown in Table 2 . The purpose of normalization is to limit the number of cases our analysis must consider. A procedure to convert a program into this normal form may need to introduce temporary variables. We also assume that all assignment statements copy values only of ground types, i.e., struct copies are transformed to element-wise copies. 1 Notice that a cast may appear only in the Assignment statement in the normal form. Such casts are only needed if we want the normalized program to be a legal C program; in all other respects, casts do not have any signi cance at all in the physical-typechecking algorithm. The declared types of variables are used only to compute the appropriate o set corresponding to a eld dereference. Table 3 shows the normalization of a few sample statements. 
Physical Type Safety
Since the semantics of C is not formally speci ed, we must state precisely what we mean by physical type safety in the context of C programs. Here, we provide only an intuitive notion of safety requirements on pointer dereferences, leaving a more formal characterization to an appendix. Appendix B describes a runtime notion of physical type safety that corresponds to these intuitive safety requirements. Intuitively, to be physically type safe, each pointer dereference should point to \valid memory", and refer to a \valid type". By valid memory, we mean that the address computed for the load of the speci ed eld from memory must be within the bounds of the allocation unit that the pointer currently points to. (Each stack-allocated variable constitutes an allocation unit, as does a chunk of memory returned by malloc.) By valid type, we mean that the ground type being referred to must be the same as the one stored at the memory location. For example, in Figure 1 in the previous section, a dereference of color from pcp is not physically type safe, because the eld color lies outside the valid memory of a Point variable. Suppose we cast &p to a pointer to struct f int x; float y; g. We would consider a dereference of the y eld as unsafe, because the ground type being referred to (i.e., float) does not match the type stored at the memory location (i.e., int), although the address of the eld does lie within the allocation unit, i.e., refers to valid memory. Note that physical type safety is still not a guarantee of absence of runtime errors. For example, it says nothing about errors related to management of heap storage and to the bounds of array references.
Physical Subtyping
A cast-free C program that type checks (and that does not use unions inconsistently) will be physically type safe. However, many C programmers nd it useful to use casts, and this motivated us to nd alternative conditions under which physical type safety could be guaranteed. A key concept in de ning such conditions is physical subtyping.
The idea behind physical subtyping is that a value of one type t may be operated upon as if it had another type t 0 , if in the memory layout of the two types, the values stored in corresponding locations \make sense". Consider the following code: We write t4t 0 to denote that t is a physical subtype of type t 0 . The intuition behind physical subtypes can be summarized as follows:
The size of a type is no larger than the size of any of its subtypes. Ground types are physical subtypes of themselves and not of other ground types. For example: { int4int { int double { double char { an enumerated type is not a physical subtype of a di erent enumerated type (or any other ground type) If a struct type is a physical subtype of another struct type then the members of two types line up in some sensible fashion. In matching two struct types, we allow a number of \relaxations", for example, attening out the struct types, or renaming their member labels.
Re exivity] The rule for structures attempts to match up one structure as a pre x of another structure. (The rule does not show the relaxations that we allow in matching struct types.) Note that there is no rule for physical subtyping that involves comparing two union types. This is because with unions, determining which branch within a union is the active one is an orthogonal problem. Note also that we have no rule for comparing two pointer types, except that we consider any pointer type to be a physical subtype of void*. In SCKR99], we report on how these subtyping rules \explain" several patterns of cast usage in C programs.
3 Physical Type Checking
Our type-checking algorithm works by performing a backwards propagation of type requirements to the program points at which a memory address is created and bound to a pointer variable. We rst describe and provide the rationale for a new domain of types that is used in our type-checking system. We then describe the main ideas behind our physical type-checking algorithm. This subsection essentially presents a type-checking algorithm that works on a restricted subset of programs. Finally, we describe the di culties we face when trying to extend the algorithm for general programs.
In Section 4, we will present the complete type-checking algorithm that works on unrestricted programs. Our motivation for splitting the presentation into two sections is that we wish to rst present the essence of physical type checking in a somewhat simpli ed setting in which we do not have to face up to the full range of complications that pointers cause us.
Type Obligations
We de ne a domain T of type obligations as follows: T = ft 1 ; : : : ; t n g; n > 1, and no single C type could guarantee that all dereferences from p would be physically type safe (see Figure 5) ; however, each of ft 1 g; : : : ; ft n g are type obligations on p.
Type obligations express su cient, but perhaps more than necessary conditions for physical type safety.
In the systems of constraints that we generate, we denote the type obligation on a variable p by hpi.
(Our intention is to nd the least restrictive type obligation for each hpi that satisifes the system of constraint.) We also introduce type obligations for pointer sources. The following syntactic occurences are pointer sources:
An address-of &var A malloc call site An array arithmetic operation a+i, where a is an array. (Multidimensional arrays also yield a pointer if the number of subscripts is less than the declared arity.)
In our constraint system, the type obligation of &v is denoted by h&vi, of a+i by h&ai, and of an occurrence of malloc at a particular program site s by hmalloc s i.
We de ne the domain of type obligations in this manner because sometimes it is not possible to infer that hpi is a single C type for each pointer-valued variable p in a procedure, even though the procedure is physically type safe. This can happen for two reasons:
Use of C unions can introduce incompatible type requirements if the dereferences refer to multiple interpretations of the union. In the rst code fragment in Figure 5 , there is no single C type that is a physical subtype of both an int and a double, and could guarantee type safety, therefore hui cannot be assigned any C type (see the discussion below). This could happen even if our algorithm were ow-sensitive. 2 The ow-insensitive nature of our inference algorithm can give rise to spurious type requirements.
In the second code fragment in Figure 5 , hpi must be a physical subtype of both struct s and struct t, even though p is used in only one way each time it is assigned. There is no C type that is a physical subtype of both struct s and struct t.
It may be tempting to infer a C union type as the least restrictive type in such cases. However, the interpretation of a union of types is an \or" of the constituent types: it provides space to store any one of the constituent types, but it may hold only one type at a time. 3 For example, union fint i; double j;g is not a physical subtype of either int or double, because we do not know which of the two elds was last stored in the union. By contrast, ft 1 ; : : : ; t n g represents an \and" of types, in the sense that it represents a type that can be all of its constituent type at the same time. Thus, fint; doubleg is a physical subtype of both int and double. The set form of type obligations gives us a way of recording information about certain kinds of inconsistent types, which is helpful in a tool that reports anomalous usages.
We also de ne a binary relation v on type obligations, which captures the fact that, if A v B and B is a type obligation for p, then A is also a type obligation for p. That is, if the right-hand-side term is su cient to be hpi for some p, then so is the left-hand-side term, by either being a physical subtype of the right-hand-side term, or including more types in the set.
The relation v has the following properties:
f: : : ; t i ; : : :g v ft i g T ftg v T t 1 4 t 2 , ft 1 g v ft 2 g
In the remainder of this paper, we will usually skip the surrounding curly braces when we mention a singleton C type in the v relation.
Inference-Based Physical Type Checking
In this subsection, we describe the intuition behind our inference-based approach to physical type checking. Our description is expressed as a simpler algorithm for physical type checking, and works only for a restricted subset of programs; the full algorithm is described in Section 4. For this subsection, assume that the program being checked does not contain second-level pointers. Second-level pointers hold pointers to variables that may themselves be pointers to other variables, or to struct variables that may contain a pointer as a member eld. 4 The type-checking algorithm works in two steps. First, it infers a least-restrictive type obligation for each pointer source (i.e., a type obligation that is greatest with respect to v). The process of inferring leastrestrictive type obligations is described below in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2. The second step of the algorithm performs type checking: it checks whether these pointer sources satisfy their type obligations.
A pointer source p satis es its type obligation if either of the following two cases hold:
1. hpi v ftg, and the static type of the variable associated with the pointer source is a physical subtype of t.
2. hpi v ft 1 ; : : : ; t n g. No static type can, in fact, be a physical subtype of two incomparable (under 4)
types. In this case, a user must use other information, such as control ow, to make a determination of physical type safety.
We provide some examples of this process in Section 3.2.3. By checking that type obligations hold at pointer sources in a program, we can determine whether or not the program is physically type safe. Note that we do not perform any checks at the actual points of dereference, because the type-inference step propagates the \needs" of these dereferences back to the pointer sources.
Field Dereference] l = e ! x or e ! x = r stype(e) = struct t ptr hei v Pre xInclusive(t; x) 
Generating Type Constraints
The type-inference procedure traverses the abstract syntax tree of the program to generate a set of relations, or constraints, on type obligations. It generates a set of constraints using the rules in Figure 6 .
The hei terms appear as \unknowns" in this set of relations|the procedure to \solve" for these terms is described in the Section 3.2.2. The relation-generation procedure also employs three auxiliary functions for constructing new C types from existing C types. Let t be a C struct type: with a new eld of the speci ed type t new . We normally use a type-obligation term, e.g., hei, in the second argument of Concat. When this is the case, Concat results in a set of C types, which is the result of mapping the function de ned above onto all the constituent C types of the type-obligation argument.
The rationale for the rules in Figure 6 as follows:
Field Dereference: The type obligation on e should be a struct that has space for an x eld at the right o set. The constructed type Pre xInclusive(t; x) expresses exactly this criterion. Note that the eld e ! x itself cannot contain a pointer value.
Pointer Dereference: The type obligation on e is typeof (*e), which constraints e to point to the (only) valid ground type. Note that e itself cannot contain a pointer value. Field Address: This rule propagates the type obligation of a pointer into the middle of a structure back to the pointer to the top of the structure. For instance, in Figure 7 , q is a pointer into the middle of the structure that p points to. The type obligation of q, based on the dereference q->x, is struct f int x;g. The type obligation on p must capture the fact that the eld at the o set o set(struct S; u) must satisfy the type obligation of q. The constructed type shown on the right in Figure 7 constrains hpi accordingly.
Plus One: For arbitrary arithmetic, the algorithm would declare the type obligation on e to be a divergent type (>). However, our algorithm takes a special interest in the case of e+1, because we can track the type obligation precisely. The rational for this rule is much as in the Field Address case: the type obligation of an internal pointer in a structure is propagated to a pointer that points to the \previous eld" in the same structure. Note that in this rule, the static type of e need not be a pointer to a struct. Assignment: The type obligation for the left-hand side of an assignment is propagated to the righthand side. That is, the assignment rule propagates type obligations counter to the direction in which values ow during execution. In this sense, the analysis is a backwards analysis (albeit ow insensitive) that propagates the \needs" originating from dereferences back to the pointer sources. Address-Of: This case is similar to Assignment.
Solving for hei
The result of the constraint-generation procedure is a set of v relations involving hei terms. We now combine the constraints so we can arrive at the values for hei terms. We use transitivity and the following resolution rules, until we have only a single relation involving any given hei term on the left-hand side.
(hei v ft 1 g)^(hei v ft 2 g)^(t 1 4 t 2 ) ) (hei v ft 1 g) (hei v ft 1 g)^(hei v ft 2 g)^(t 1 6 4 t 2 )^(t 2 6 4 t 1 ) ) (hei v ft 1 ; t 2 g) These rules, which follow from the properties of v mentioned in Section 3.1, either eliminate types that are already covered by other types because of physical subtyping, or if they are not related by subtyping, combine them into a multi-element set. The nal right-hand-side value in hei v T is the answer we get for hei. Since struct fint x, y, colorg 4 struct fint x, yg, the simpli ed constraint for h&pi is h&pi v struct fint x, y, colorg. Accordingly, the solution for h&pi is struct fint x, y, colorg. Since the declared type of p, Point, is not a physical subtype of h&pi, the program is unsafe. Notice that the algorithm did not attach any signi cance to the type cast used in Figure 1 (cf. (1) above) . From constraint (4), the solution for hri is struct fdouble frequencyg. From (3), the solution for hci is Concat(Clock; struct fdouble frequencyg), or struct fClock c, struct fdouble frequencyg rg. 7 From (2), the solution for hpcri is struct f struct fClock c, struct fdouble frequencyg rg sg, 8 which, by (1), becomes the solution to h&cri. Since ClockRadio is a physical subtype of the last constructed type, the program type checks.
Example 5. Figure 8 presents an example of a code where the ow-insensitive nature of our algorithm forces us to infer multi-set types as least restrictive type obligations. In this code fragment, a void* variable p is used to hold, at one time, address of a Point variable, and at another time, address of a ColorPoint variable. hpi evaluates to f Point, RealPoint g. However, when f Point, RealPoint g is compared against &pt and &rpt, we will be forced to announce a possible unsafety. As an aside, if prior to running our algorithm, a conversion to single-static assignment form performed on the program (so independent occurrences of p are named di erently), the algorithm would declare the program to be safe. An attractive feature of inference-based type checking is that it propagates use information back to the source. This has an obvious advantage from the standpoint of reverse-engineering and programcomprehension applications|one can gure out exactly in which ways a given struct variable is used in a program. This information can also be used to re ne the type declarations of procedure parameters.
The Pointer Subtyping Problem
We now turn to the restrictions on pointers that we placed on the program in the algorithm in Section 3.2. Suppose we wish to type check the case in which a member eld of a structure itself is a pointer. Consider the following candidate rule for pointer elds: 7 The eld names such as c and r are actually o sets in the implementation and thus speci c names are unimportant. The following example shows that this rule is not sound.
Example 6. Consider the code in Figure 9 . We generate the following constraints:
h&cpsi v hpspi 
hcpi v struct f int x, y, color g
From (6), the value of hcpi is ColorPoint. From (5), which comes from the Pointer Field Dereference rule, hcpspi is struct f int common, ColorPoint *p g. From (4), hpspi is struct fint common, Point *p g. From (1) and (2), and the fact that struct f int common, ColorPoint *p g is a physical subtype of struct fint common, Point *p g (by the (unsound) pointer subtyping rule), h&cpsi is struct f int common, ColorPoint *p g. Since CPS is a physical subtype of the last constructed type, the program type checks. However, the program is actually unsafe because it accesses the color eld of pt, which is only a Point. Intuitively, the pointer subtyping rule is not sound because it cannot track indirect modi cations. In the example just presented, we indirectly modi ed the value of cpsp->p (by assigning to psp->p, rather than cpsp->p). Had we \visibly" assigned a Point pointer value to cpsp->p, we would have been able to catch the error. (Incidentally, the void pointers rule of Figure 4 is sound, because void pointers cannot be dereferenced.)
An Algorithm for Physical Type Checking
In this section, we present an algorithm for physical type checking that works on all programs, no matter how many levels of pointers are used. The algorithm follows the same pattern as the restrictive algorithm presented in Section 3.2: it generates a set of constraints involving type obligations, and uses the nal type obligations to check the pointer sources. We add a new kind of type-obligation term into our constraint system, and we use a di erent set of rules to generate the constraints. We rst describe these two changes, and then illustrate the algorithm with an example. We also compare this algorithm with points-to analysis.
Type Obligations Revisited
The hpi type obligations presented so far are, by construction, the smallest (ordered by v) type that can be safely read via a dereference of p. This is p's get type obligation. We now introduce a complementary set type obligation. The set type obligation of p, denoted by p], is the largest type (ordered by v)|or least restrictive type|that must be written through a pointer. The following example illustrates this idea.
Example 7. Consider the code fragment in Figure 10 . The set type obligation on pp is ColorPoint, because, when we assign through pp, as in *pp = &p, we require a particular constraint on the righthand-side pointer value. This is because the assignment indirectly modi es q, and hqi = ColorPoint.
Thus, pp] = ColorPoint.
Intuitively, the set type obligation for a pointer variable represents the get type obligations of the elements in its points-to set. By tracking the set type obligation of a pointer variable in addition to its get type obligation, we are able to deal with the problem of pointer subtyping.
Get-Type and Set-Type Inference
Physical type checking is expressed in terms of the inference rules presented in Figure 11 , which now involve constraints over unknowns of the form hpi and p]. Note that in the new rules, we not only generate constraints from the statements in the program (as before), but also infer new constraints from previously generated constraints. We rst explain the new items of notation used in Figure 11 . r:b a stands for the base-o set representation of the eld a in a structure r. Because of type casting, one can view a structure of type S as a structure of type T. When a eld named a that belongs to type T is accessed, it does not follow that a corresponding a eld exists in the type S. Assignment: This rule is similar to the assignment rule in Figure 6 , except that now it also propagates the set-type obligations in a forward direction. Set-type obligations ow forwards, originating from address-of statements (e.g., p = &x) through simple assignments (e.g., q = p) to indirect modi cation statements (e.g., q = v).
In the remaining rules, the rst parts are the same as in Figure 6 in each case. We describe the rationale only for the second parts.
Pointer Dereference: Consider the R case (the L case is analogous). This rule can be thought of as an assignment to p of all of the variables that q might point to. If q points to some variable r, we have q] v hri, either generated directly, or inferred. We infer the constraints that we would generate for the assignment p = r. Field Dereference: Consider the R case (the L case is analogous). For each structure r that q may point to, we infer the constraints that we would generate for the assignment p = r:b a. Field Address: This statement essentially translates the pointer q by a particular o set within the structure r that q points to. The eld r:b a denotes the eld whose address is assigned to p. By the reasoning of the Address-of case, p's set obligation must satisfy the get obligation of that eld. Plus One: If q points to (any eld of) a structure r, in general we do not know, which eld might q+1 point to. To be conservative, we assume that p may point to anywhere in the structure (which is the same behavior that we want on arbitrary arithmetic). This now reduces to Field O set case, but with all possible o sets in r taken into account.
After we perform inference (until no more new judgments are obtained), we use the values of the get-type obligation on pointer sources to perform actual type safety checking. The latter process is the same as in the restrictive algorithm of Section 3. Our inference rules can be encoded in a class of set constraints that is known to be solvable in cubic time (we sketch this encoding in Section 5).
Example 8. Reconsider the code in Figure 9 . Using the rules in Figure 11 , we generate the following chain of inferences:
( Example 9. The purpose of this example is to point out a possibility of divergence during constraint generation and inference, and one way to avoid it. Consider the following three statements: 
Comparison with Flow-Insensitive Points-To Analysis
In this section, we explore the connection between the algorithm presented above and previous work on ow-insensitive points-to analysis And94, Ste96, SH97, YHR99].
The goal of points-to analysis is to compute, for each pointer variable p, a set of variables whose address p might contain. The physical-type-checking algorithm has most in common with algorithms for pointsto analysis that distinguish between elds of structures Ste96, WL95, YHR99, ZRL96]. Like much of this work, our analysis tracks elds in terms of a base pointer and a numeric o set. Consequently, the information obtained from the analysis is speci c to a given platform (although we are con dent that a portable, platform-independent version could be developed).
The rst point to note is that the nature of the information obtained from physical type checking and points-to analysis is di erent: In points-to analysis, the information obtained is that a variable p might contain the address of a variable q; in contrast, with physical type checking the information obtained is that the type of a variable q (where the address of q is taken somewhere in the program) needs to have a certain collection of elds for pointer dereferences in the program to be safe. There are also di erences in \philosophy" behind the two kinds of analyses:
To obtain points-to information, one makes an a priori assumption that the given types of variables are correct, at least insofar as determining the size of a variable is concerned. If the declared type of a variable is inadequate with respect to actual dereferences in the program (e.g., the declared type is Point when the dereferences demand a ColorPoint), a points-to analysis would either (i) quit, (ii) assume (pessimistically) that an arbitrary piece of memory in the activation record has been clobbered, or (iii) assume (optimistically) that the out-of-bound access does not clobber other variables in the activation record. For example, in such a scenario, Steensgaard's algorithm Ste96] will fail to \type check" or produce a points-to graph. In contrast, in our approach, all accesses are treated as if they must fall within bounds; that is, the essence of our approach is to infer the types that would make all accesses fall within bounds. The algorithm discriminates between structure elds to maintain precision, but does not \trust" the declared types. Most points-to analyses attempt to track the consequences of whatever casts a programmer has made use of in his or her program. The motivation behind physical type checking is di erent. We identify a class of \sensible" casts that we are prepared to handle|e.g., upcasts from a subtype to a supertype|and deem all others unacceptable. The notion of \sensible" is motivated by a number of idioms that C programmers use to simulate object-oriented language features SCKR99].
A key technical di erence between physical type checking and points-to analysis is that physical type checking involves a backwards propagation of needs as opposed to a forwards propagation of points-to information.
Despite these di erences, there are some similarities between physical type checking and points-to analysis. For one thing, the augmented rules of Section 4.2 must account for the e ect of indirect modi cations via pointers. In addition, a judgement p] v hri that arises in our analysis is somewhat similar to a pointsto fact points-to(p; r), and some of the rules by which our analysis infers such judgements are similar to Example 10. Consider the following three statements:
1. q = &r 2. s = &q 3. p = q A pointer-analysis would infer the following points-to facts: points-to(q; r), points-to(s; q), and points-to(p; r).
In particular, Andersen's analysis would generate the following proof tree: p == &r points-to(q; r) points-to(p; r) Correspondingly, our analysis would generate the following proof tree:
Our proof tree has a slightly di erent shape, because in our system, p = q does not insist on an immediate judgment of the form q] v hri. However, our analysis also admits another proof tree:
Although points-to(s; p) does not hold, the inferred judgment s] v hpi is appropriate. It says that p's get-type obligation must be larger that s's set-type obligation, which makes sense given the points-to relations that do hold. This example shows that the judgement p] v hri is not the same as points-to(p; r).
It should be noted that pointer analysis does give alternative ways to do physical type checking.
One possible physical type-checking algorithm can work in two phases, by performing an alias analysis in the rst phase, and the type inference of Section 3.2 in the second phase. Recall the problem we faced in formulating a subtyping rule for pointers (Section 3.3). We found that the \obvious" pointer subtyping rule was not sound, because it could not track indirect modi cations. Two l-values in a program are aliases if they may denote the same memory location. The results of a points-to analysis can be used to compute alias relationships:
{ If p points to x, then p and x are aliases. { If p and q are variables that have a common member in their points-to sets, p and q are aliases.
{ If e 1 and e 2 are aliases, so are e 1 :a and e 2 :a, where a is a eld in a structure that both e 1 and e 2 may denote (as l-values).
Given alias information, we can augment the restricted algorithm of Section 3 in the following manner: In each case of an assignment lhs = rhs, we assume that all aliases of the left-hand side are also assigned the right-hand-side value.
In the example of Figure 9 , once aliasing information is taken into account, the algorithm would expose the type-safety violation as follows: Because cpsp->p is an alias of psp->p, the assignment psp->p = q also requires us to consider the e ect of cpsp->p = q. We now have h&pti v hqi v hcpsp ! pi v hcpi v struct fint x, y, colorg; which propagates the type obligation on cp to &pt. Another possibility is to use the results of points-to analysis to \directly" perform physical typechecking, without invoking the type-inference step of Section 3.2. Given the points-to relation, we can verify the validity of each eld dereference p ! a by looking for the eld a in each points-to target of p. This approach, however, is not as well-suited to reverse engineering, because it does not actually construct an expected type for the target. Starting from the results of points-to analysis, one will need to perform a computation similar to the one given in Section 3.2 to construct expected types.
Although the results from a points-to analysis can be used to achieve the goals of physical type checking, this involves working \outside the type system". In particular, it addresses the issue of physical subtyping in the presence of pointers indirectly, at best. One of our contributions is the formulation of a rule for physical subtyping in the presence of pointers. The key idea in our approach involves introducing two distinct variables in the constraint system per program variable. This approach may have applications beyond physical type checking.
Implementation
Our implementation rst uses a C front end to build an abstract syntax tree (AST) of a program. It then traverses the AST and generates constraints in a form suitable for being solved by Bane FA97], a publicly available constraint solver from University of California, Berkeley. In this section, we describe several implementation details that arise in this process.
Dealing with structure elds
Our algorithm relies on a base-o set scheme to refer to the elds of a struct and therefore discriminates between elds precisely (though not portably). In order to follow the algorithm faithfully, an implementation must store separately the type-obligation information for every o set that can be referred to in each structure. In practice, a given implementation may trade precision for lower memory requirements and higher speed. An implementation may choose not to discriminate between the elds of a struct by deliberately taking each o set (an b a term) to be zero. An implementation might also choose to maintain precise information only as long as the maximum cumulative o set remains below a prespeci ed threshold.
Handling of Arrays and Function Pointers
Variables of an array type are treated as pointers to the memory the array occupies. Thus, an array a is treated as &a, where a is the name of the block of memory corresponding to the array. (A syntactic address-of operator applied to an array is treated as a no-op.) A read or write to any individual array element is treated as a read or write to a, the entire array.
Function names are lifted to be pointers to function de nitions. (A syntactic address-of operator applied to a function is treated as a no-op.) Each function de nition is also associated with a special return variable. The algorithm tracks function pointers in 0-CFA style. At call sites, formal parameters are considered to be assigned the values of actual parameters, 9 and a (possibly dummy) variable gets assigned the value of the function's return variable. Our treatment of arrays and function pointers is similar to that of Foster et al. FFA97].
Constraint Solving
We now sketch how to express our algorithm in Bane. Our intention here is only to give a avor of how our algorithm can be implemented with Bane to the reader. An actual implementation of our algorithm includes more details, e.g. handling of struct elds, which we do not describe here. This is also not a complete description of Bane: for further details on Bane and on how to use it to perform program analyses (including points-to analysis), we refer the reader to FA97, FFA97] . We use the part of Bane that deals with sets. To begin with, Bane has variables and constructors, both of which are expressions of type set. For example, one might declare a 0-ary constructor R : unit ! s, and a binary constructor C : (s; ?s) ! s. The binary constructor declaration speci es that its rst argument is covariant and second argument contravariant. An example of an expression using this constructor is C(R; 0), where the constant 0 denotes the empty set (1 denotes the universal set). Finally, Bane de nes an inclusion relation on expressions. Thus, C(R; 0) p says that the set denoted by variable p includes the set denoted by the constructed term C(R; 0). The Bane interpretation of inclusion is the same as the usual subset relation on sets. For example, is transitive, and 0 p for all p.
In encoding our constraints in Bane, we exploit constructors that have both covariant and contravariant positions. Bane resolves constructed terms as follows. Two constructed terms cannot be compared with unless their constructor is the same (a violation of this leads to an error). With the same constructor, resolution introduces element-wise inclusion constraints, with the sense of inclusion reversed for contravariant arguments. Thus, C(R; q) C(p; 0) result in, R p and 0 q.
We now show how to write out an initial set of constraints as Bane constraints, starting from a program's AST. We will illustrate that the inferred constraints emerge automatically from Bane's resolution procedure. We rst de ne a 4-ary constructor F : (?s; s; ?s; s) ! s. (The role of the four positions will be explained shortly.) In the following, keep in mind that the ordering imposed by our v connective is in the opposite sense of Bane's . See Table 4 : Bane constraints generated for normalized statements. The constructed type in the last row is actually concealed from Bane behind a 0-ary constructor unique to the constructed type.
The rst two positions in the constructor F are used to store the set-type obligations, and the remaining two positions are used to store the get-type obligations. Within each pair, the rst position is used as a contravariant argument and the second as a covariant argument. We select which of the two positions to use in such a way that the ow of set-type obligations is forwards and that of get-type obligations is backwards. It is easiest to explain this using an example.
Example 11. Consider the following two statements:
1. q = &p; 2. t = *q;
In Figure 11 , the rule for Dereference (R) would propagate the get-type obligation on t to p by inferring a new constraint. We can see that a similar propagation in Bane occurs by contravariance: From (1), by rule (i) of terms to detect cycles. In this particular example, both hsi and hti evaluate to a divergent value (>).
We have created a prototype implementation of our algorithm using Bane. Our plan is to tune the implementation and run it on large code bases, in particular, code from a Lucent Technologies product, and report our experiences. Comparison to Record Subtyping Our work has some similarity to record subtyping proposed by Cardelli Car84] . In both cases, a structure (or record) that contains a superset of the elds of another structure is considered a subtype of the second structure. The primary di erence is that we take into account the physical layout of data types when determining subtype relationships, while in Cardelli's work the notion of a physical layout does not apply. The problem of subtyping in the presence of pointer elds inside structures appears to be related to the problem of record subtyping in the presence of mutable elds AC96]. We plan to investigate this relationship in future work.
Relation to Points-to and Alias Analysis We already presented a comparison between ow-insensitive points-to analysis and physical-type-safety analysis in Section 4.3. In ZRL96], which also presents an alias-analysis algorithm, a subtype-like relationship called a weakly right-regular relation is de ned for pairs of C expressions. The de nition of the relation has some of the avor of the physical-subtyping rules discussed here. However, the system described in ZRL96] has no provision for handling type casts and considers two structs to be related only if they are of equal type, whereas in our system the structs are related if one is a physical subtype of the other. We would like to clear up a possible terminological confusion that may arise when our work is compared to that of Foster et al. FFA97] . In that work, the use of \get" and \set" components of a type variable in the type-inference scheme corresponds to the covariant and contravariant aspects, respectively, of the same type variable. Our use of \get" and \set" corresponds to two di erent type variables, each of which themselves have covariant and contravariant components in a Bane implementation.
Constraint-based analyses The constraint-based analysis for inferring most general physical types gathers information about \access obligations" that a variable's type must satisfy. This bears some relationship to certain kinds of (backwards, ow-sensitive) need-based analyses developed in the functionalprogramming community, including algorithms for neededness Hug88], strictness analysis WH87], program slicing RT96], and dependence analysis Liu98]. These all use the idea of treating the accesses on a variable as a \contract" to limit attention to certain portions of the variable in question; the minimal obligations on a variable are determined by accounting for all of the accesses on it. Our work has applied this idea in the context of a ow-insensitive analysis for C (an imperative language that supports destructive updating of heap-allocated storage). Our algorithm incorporates the notion of a \set-type obligation" in order to handle destructive updating.
Conclusions
We have presented an algorithm to perform physical type checking on C programs. Physical type checking can be useful for static safety checks, and also has application to program comprehension and reverse engineering.
In the near future, we plan to experiment with physical type checking on several large software systems, particularly on a proprietary product of Lucent Technologies that consists of several hundred thousands of lines of code.
A Data Layout in the ANSI C standard
In this section, we brie y review the storage model for C data structures. For a more detailed account, the reader is directed to HS91, KR88, ISO90]. All data objects in C are represented by an integral number of bytes in memory. The size of a data object is the number of bytes occupied by the data object HS91]. A character type (char, signed char, unsigned char) is de ned to occupy one byte of memory. The sizes of other C types are implementation dependent, but must conform to the following guidelines:
signed, unsigned, const, and volatile quali ers do not a ect the size of a type. For example, an unsigned int is of the same size as a const int.
shorts and ints require at least 16 bits. shorts are no longer than ints. longs require at least 32 bits. ints are no longer than longs. floats, doubles, and long doubles require at least 32 bits. a union requires at least as much storage as its largest member. a struct requires at least as much storage as the sum of the storage of its members, respecting the alignments of its members (see below).
Some computers allow an object to be stored at any address in memory, regardless of the type of the object. However, many computers impose alignment restrictions on certain data types. Some types are required to be stored at addresses that are integral multiples of bytes. If a data object is stored in accordance with its type's alignment restriction, expressions (other than casts) involving that object are portable across all C compilers compliant with the C standard. However, because of the ability of C programmers to cast an expression of one type to be of another type, it is possible to make an end-run around alignment restrictions resulting in non-portable code.
Character types have no alignment restrictions since they occupy only one byte of memory. The alignment restrictions of other C types are implementation dependent, but conform to the following guidelines:
signed, unsigned, const, and volatile quali ers do not a ect the alignment of a type. For example, an unsigned int has the same alignment as a const int. The alignment of a struct or union is no less than the maximum alignment of its members.
The storage rules of struct types dictate that the rst member be stored at the beginning of the struct. All subsequent members are stored in the order they are declared within the struct. The alignments of the types of the members of a struct may require that unused space be placed between members. For example, suppose a machine requires integers to be stored at four-byte multiples. Consider the following struct: struct f char a; int b; char c; g x;
If the struct is stored at address 0, then x.a is at address 0, x.b is at address 4 (not address 1), and x.c is at address 8. Furthermore, the entire struct is padded to be a multiple of its largest alignment, resulting in a total size of 12 bytes. We say that the number of bytes between the address of a eld of a struct and the struct itself is the o set of the eld. C guarantees that the o set of the rst member (assuming it is not a bit eld) of a struct is 0 and the o set of any other member (again, assuming it is not a bit eld) is a multiple of the alignment of the type of that member. C guarantees that all non-bit-eld members of unions are placed at o set 0. The storage of bit-eld members is implementation dependent. In our type system (see Figure 3) we assume that o sets are supplied explicitly. In our implementation (see Section 5) we assume that for struct types without bit elds, the members are stored as close together as possible without violating alignment restrictions. o x + sizeof (stype(e->x)) sizeof (typeat(t e ; o e )). The intuition behind this condition is that the referred memory location should lie within the \chunk" of memory that e currently points to. typeat(stype(e); o x ) = typeat(t e ; o e + o x ). The refered location must contain the same type of data as the type of eld x.
Consider the application of this instrumentation to the last two statements in Figure 1 . The dynamic type of &p is (Point,0), which is propagated to become the dynamic type of the pointer pcp. The dereference pcp->x is physically type safe because the type Point contains an integer at o set 0. The dereference pcp->color is not physically type safe because the o set of the eld color is outside of the type Point. We illustrate how pointers are tracked as they move within a struct using Figure 2 . After execution of the rst statement, the dynamic type of c is (ClockRadio,0). After execution of the second statement, the dynamic type of r is (ClockRadio,sizeof (Clock)), which represents the type Radio. Thus, the dereference r->frequency is physically type safe.
